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Brazil is trapped in a low-intermediation state, exhibiting both a low level and low efficiency of
financial intermediation. The lack of external financing and high cost of credit has hindered the
expansion of the private sector and the supply response of firms to shocks and economic reforms.
Given the importance that a well-developed financial sector has for economic growth, reforms
that can increase the level and improve the efficiency of financial intermediation should be high
on policy makers’ agendas.
Across countries, the legal and regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate has
been found to be an important determinant of financial development, and in turn for economic
growth.  The rights of secured and unsecured creditors, the enforcement of contracts and the
sharing of credit information between intermediaries are important components of this legal and
regulatory environment.  Compared to other countries, Brazil shows a low level of contract
enforcement and limited information sharing. The weaknesses in these components of the legal
and regulatory framework can partly explain the low-intermediation trap in Brazil and the feeble
growth.
Recent reforms, such as the extension of alienação fiduciaria to housing, the introduction of the
cédula de crédito bancario, the legal separation of principal and interest, and improvements of
the credit information systems are useful steps in strengthening the framework.  More is needed,
however.  Reforms that will significantly increase the level and efficiency of financial
intermediation and have a positive impact on economic growth include: improved efficiency of
the judicial sector and greater enforceability of contracts; stronger rights of secured and
unsecured creditors; higher quality of information by strengthening accounting standards and
practices; and the development of a legal and regulatory framework to facilitate the sharing of
negative as well as positive information about borrowers between financial institutions.
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1. Introduction
The development and efficiency of financial intermediaries are important determinants of
economic growth.  Countries with higher levels of financial development experience higher
productivity and GDP per capita growth rates.
2  Brazil exhibits both a low level and low
efficiency of financial intermediation, as evidenced by the indicators in Table 1. This
underdevelopment applies to bank intermediated funds, private bond markets, and stock markets.
Liquid Liabilities to GDP are lower than the Latin American and the upper middle income group
average.  Private credit as share of GDP is at the average Latin American level, but lower than
the average for upper middle income countries.  Furthermore, half of this credit is provided by
state-owned institutions. The ex post net interest margins and the overhead costs of banks are
significantly higher than the averages for both Latin American and upper middle income group
countries.
Table 1: Financial intermediation in Brazil relative to other countries
Liquid
Liabilities
Private Credit Net Interest Margin Overhead Costs
Brazil 28.04 29.70 7.76 7.30
Sample mean 54.00 50.77 3.99 4.03
Latin America 34.90 29.49 5.54 5.81
of which: Argentina 21.67 18.29 4.20 6.74
                 Chile 42.03 68.17 3.89 2.95
                 Mexico 26.56 15.79 3.64 6.57
Upper middle
income countries
57.56 49.65 4.09 3.87
OECD countries 76.28 88.51 2.68 2.73
Notes: Liquid Liabilities = currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries as share
of GDP; Private Credit = total claims on private nonfinancial sector by financial institutions as share of GDP; Net
Interest Margin = accounting value of a bank's net interest revenue as share of total assets; Overhead costs =
accounting value of a bank's overhead cost as share of total asset; Net interest margin and overhead cost numbers
include both private and public and both domestic and foreign banks. All numbers are for 1997.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine (1999).
In addition to the low level of private credit, the average maturity of loans is low in Brazil.  The
ratio of long- to short-term debt for the median Brazilian company is 1.23, compared to an
average of 2.20 for OECD countries.
3  Anecdotal evidence suggests that most small and medium
size companies in Brazil only obtain short-term bank credit with maturities of at most 90 days.
Sources of long-term finance are very limited and mainly from state-owned development banks,
such as BNDES.
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There are many explanations for this low-intermediation trap in Brazil.  The adverse
macroeconomic environment is an important cause, but not the only. This note analyzes the
importance of legal and regulatory impediments in explaining the level and the efficiency of
financial intermediation in Brazil.  Using cross-country experiences, it quantifies the negative
effects of impediments in the Brazilian legal system on the development and efficiency of the
financial sector and therefore on economic growth.  Section 2 discusses the institutional
framework (creditor rights, their enforcement, accounting standards and credit information
systems) in Brazil.  Section 3 uses international evidence to stress the importance of these
institutional features for financial intermediation. Section 4 shows the importance of the
institutional framework for the size of net interest margins. Section 5 discusses policy
implications for Brazil and areas for reforms.
2.   Creditor Rights, Contract Enforcement and Information Sharing in
Brazil
The ability of creditors to enforce claims is key to the development of an efficient financial
system.  On an international comparison, Brazil’s creditor rights are neither specifically weak,
nor specifically strong (Table 2).  In reorganization and liquidation, Brazil compares favorably on
some dimensions; there is no automatic stay on secured assets upon filing of a reorganization
petition, thereby not preventing secured creditors from taking possession of collateral, and there
are restrictions when debtors file for reorganization: unsecured creditors representing a minimum
share of claims can oppose the petition for reorganization on certain grounds, and secured
creditors are not bound by the reorganization plan.  On the other hand, the claims of secured
creditors are not ranked first in the case of liquidation, but rank after claims of workers and tax
authorities. Finally, management stays in charge of the operation of their business during
reorganization, thus decreasing the power of creditors.
Table 2: Creditor rights and contract enforcement in Brazil relative to other countries
Creditor rights Contract enforceability
Brazil 2 2.02
Sample mean 2.32 2.50
Latin America 1.38 1.92
Of which: Argentina 1 2.07
                 Chile 2 2.42




OECD countries 1.82 2.99
Creditor rights: index of secured creditor rights, with values between 0 (worst) and 4 (best). Source: La Porta et al.
(1997). Contract enforceability: indicator of the degree to which contracts are honored, with values between 1
(worst) and 4 (best)-. Source: Business International Corporation.
Regardless of the presence of creditors rights, these rights need to be enforced, and in this
dimension, Brazil’s judicial system scores considerably below countries in the upper middle
income group and OECD countries, as evidenced by a cross-country indicator of contract4
enforceability (see Table 2). This inefficiency of the legal system is confirmed by a recent World
Bank study on the efficiency of court systems in 11 countries.
4  The study shows that there are
2,975 and 3,129 cases pending per judge in Brasilia and Sao Paulo, respectively, compared to
only 58 in Singapore and 244 in Hungary. The congestion rate, i.e., the ratio of caseloads to
resolved cases per judge is 277% in Sao Paulo and 302% in Brasilia, compared to 111% in
Singapore and 164% in Peru. The time to resolve a case, the number of cases pending at the start
of the year divided by the number of cases resolved during this year, is 1.6 years for Sao Paulo
and 1.9 years for Brasilia, compared to 0.04 years in Singapore and 0.5 years in Germany.
The evidence on actual bankruptcy cases in Brazil paints an even more inefficient judicial
system. According to an estimate by Pinheiro and Cabral (1999), a judicial execution to recover a
creditor claim can take between 1 and 10 years. Since recognition and collection of debt are
adjudicated in separate proceedings, the debtor has many additional possibilities to delay
payment.  The inconsistent application of law due to the very limited role of binding precedent, a
high degree of discretionary power for judges and the possibility of several levels of appeal up to
the highest courts further undermine efficient contract enforcement in Brazil and negatively
affect the resolution of credit disputes in courts.
Sharing information about borrowers is an important way for lenders to learn more about current
and potential customers.  It helps reduce frictions in the credit market by (i) allowing lenders a
better assessment of borrowers, (ii) reducing informational rents and thereby increasing
competition between lenders, and (iii) disciplining borrowers.  In Brazil, there are several public
and private data banks on borrowers.  Most of them, however, contain only negative information
about debtors that have defaulted and then only during the default period. There are no
comprehensive credit record systems as in the U.S. and other countries yet.  Due to the lack of
positive debtor information, such as financial data, debt exposure, guarantees, etc., banks are
restricted in their use of credit scoring models to in-house information about debtors.  Regional
fragmentation and the lack of sharing information between different institutions constitute further
weaknesses in credit information sharing in Brazil.
In addition to the sharing of information, accounting standards that simplify the interpretability
and comparability of firms’ balance sheets and income statements are important for the
development of efficient financial intermediaries.
5  Information about firms is more reliable, can
be more easily processed and contracts between firms and banks better enforced with better
accounting standards. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) has
developed an indicator based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in companies’ annual
reports which allows a comparison of the quality of financial statements across countries. On this
accounting standards index, Brazil (54) scores better than other Latin American countries (46)
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and at the average for upper middle income groups (54).  Its accounting standards, however, are
below the average for OECD countries (65).
6
3.  The Importance of Creditor Rights, Contract Enforcement and
Information Sharing for Financial Development
Financial intermediary development has a causal impact on economic growth.  Creditor rights,
their enforcement and the information that creditors can obtain about debtors in turn are
important determinants of financial intermediary development.
7  In the following, we analyze
cross-country and Brazil-specific evidence to underline the importance of these policy areas for
the development of the financial sector in Brazil.
Cross county evidence shows that creditor rights in particular the absence of an automatic stay
on assets and required replacement of management are important determinants of a well-
developed financial system.  The lack of the right to replace management explains partly the low
level of financial intermediation in Brazil.  More important than the presence of these rights,
however, is the general level of contract enforcement. Table A1 presents the results of a simple
regression of private credit on contract enforceability, controlling for other determinants of
financial development, including the negative impact that high inflation has on financial
intermediation.
8  As can be seen from Table A1, contract enforceability exhibits a statistically
significant and economically large impact on the level of private credit.  If Brazil had achieved
the average rank in contract enforceability for OECD countries, a strong assumption, private
credit as share of GDP would have been more than twice as high 55% instead of 25% over
the period 1980-95, even when controlling for the adverse macro-economic conditions in Brazil.
Considering the regression results reported in Table A2, this higher level of financial
intermediary development would have resulted in 1.19 percentage points higher annual GDP
growth rate over the period 1980-95, i.e., 1.51% instead of 0.32%.
9
Table A3 presents additional evidence on the importance of efficient judicial systems for
financial sector development at the industry level.  Previous research has shown that industries
that depend more heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with a higher level of
financial development.
10  The results in Table A3 indicate that industries with a higher need of
external finance grow faster in a legal and institutional environment in which contracts and
creditor rights are enforced more effectively.  Given an average dependence on external finance
of 21 percent (the ratio of external financing relative to investment) across Brazilian industries,
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the unweighted average industrial growth rate over the period 1980-89 would have been 4.3%
instead of 3.7%, if Brazil had achieved the average rank in contract enforceability of OECD
countries, again a strong assumption.  The effect is even stronger for industries that depend
heavily on external finance.  The plastic product industry, for example, with an external
dependence of 114% would have grown by 0.1% instead of –2.9%, if Brazil had achieved the
level of contract enforcement of OECD countries.
Table A4 reinforces the previous results using firm-level data.  A recent study by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998) shows that in countries with a more efficient legal system, a higher share
of firms use long-term financing. They analyze the proportion of firms in countries that grow
faster than predicted by internal cash flow and short-term credit availability using an indicator of
the rule of law, and controlling for other firm-specific and country characteristics. The results
indicate that the legal environment has a statistically significant and economically large impact
on the proportion of firms whose growth rate exceeds the growth that could have been supported
by internal cash flow and short-term debt only.  If Brazil had achieved the average level of rule of
law as the OECD countries, a very significant improvement, more long-term finance would have
been available, and 50% instead of 37% of Brazilian firms would have been able to grow beyond
the constraints imposed by internal cash flows and short-term debt.
While the evidence presented so far relies on cross-country studies, the results from a recent
Brazil study by Pinheiro and Cabral (1999) confirm these findings.  Their analysis relies on the
variance in private credit and the efficiency of the judicial system across Brazilian states.  They
show that states with more efficient judicial systems have a higher share of private credit to their
GDP.  To assess the economic significance of these results, consider the state of Sergipe in North
East Brazil, which had the lowest level of judicial efficiency and a share of credit to GDP of
11.15% in 1996.  An increase to the average judicial efficiency in the North East would triple the
credit activity in Sergipe to 31.11%. 
11 Additional anecdotal evidence suggests that banks try to
avoid certain states with weak judicial systems in their credit activity.
12
The quality and amount of information creditors can obtain about potential borrowers is also an
important determinant of financial development.  To assess this impact quantitatively, we regress
private credit on two dummies that indicate whether a country has a negative (black) information
system only or a positive (black and white) information system.
13 The results in Table A1
indicate that the existence of a black and white information system increases private credit by
about 21 percentage points of GDP, whereas the existence of a black information system only
does not have any significant impact on financial development.  If Brazil moved from its current
system of mostly negative information to a system with both positive and negative information,
its level of private credit over the period 1980-95 would have been 45% of GDP instead of 25%.
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12 See Pinheiro (1998).
13 This regression uses data collected by Japelli and Pagano (1999).  Although these data do not correspond to the
same time period as the data on Private Credit, we continue using data over 1980-95 to make our results comparable
to column 1 in Table A1.7
This in turn would have raised growth by about one percentage point, similar to the gains from
the improvement in the enforceability of contracts.
4.  The Determinants of Net Interest Margins
Brazil exhibits not only a low level of financial intermediation, but also one of the highest net
interest margins in the world (Table 1): over the 1988-95 period, margins in Brazil were twice as
high compared to other middle-income developing countries.  Overhead costs and taxes were
also much higher in Brazil than in other comparable countries.  In the following we analyze the
relationship of the determinants of the level of financial intermediation and net interest margins.
Net interest margins can be measured in different ways, by either considering the ex-ante spread
between deposit and lending rates, or by focusing on the ex-post difference between actual
interest revenue and cost.  There are methodological advantages and disadvantages of both
measures.  Ex-ante spreads partly reflect credit risk, which varies significantly across classes of
firms and countries.  Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent quoted rates reflect actual
transactions. Ex-post spreads capture actual net interest income, and thus reflect actual
transactions and correct for the differences in rates charged to borrowers. While ex-post margins
also include the actual degree of defaults, they can be distorted if interest income and loan loss
reserving associated with a particular loan occurs in different periods.  Neither measure takes into
account fee-based income, which is gaining in importance for banks both in developed and
developing countries.   And both measures depend on accurate reporting and good quality
financial information.
Table 3 presents the net interest margins and fee based income as share of total assets for the past
years for the three largest banks in Brazil, which account for more than 50% of the private
banking sector. While net interest margins have come down recently, fee income as share of
assets has increased.  Increasing the fee-based income has been one way for Brazilian banks to
replace the float income they lost as inflation has come down in recent years. But by standards of
most countries, these margins are still very high.  Contributing factors include the very volatile
macro-economic environment in which Brazilian banks have had to operate, the high reserve
requirements and obligatory lending Brazilian banks have been subject to, the weak judicial
systems, a protected banking system, and high financial intermediation taxation.
Table 3: Net interest margins and fee income for Brazilian banks
1995 1996 1997
Net interest margin / Assets 14.5% 10.5% 9.5%
Fee income / Assets 3.3% 4.5% 4.4%
Note: The numbers are unweighted averages for Unibanco. Bradesco and Itau, the largest three private banks.
Source: ABN-AMRO
The recent Central Bank study has identified credit risk, taxes and overhead costs as the main
determinants of the high ex-ante spreads in Brazil.  Delinquency was identified as the largest
component of the interest rate spread, with direct and indirect taxes constituting the second
largest component (Figure 1).  These results confirm the importance of legal and judicial reform8
to reduce the costs of financial intermediation in Brazil and the need to (gradually) reduce
financial intermediation taxation and obligatory lending requirements.
Figure 1: Composition of the interest rate spread in Brazil.
 Source: Banco Central do Brasil (1999)
Using ex-ante spreads, however, does not allow one to analyze the incidence of particular reserve
requirements or taxes.  It might well be, for example, that banks compensate high financial
intermediation taxation on particular instruments (e.g., demand deposits) through lower interest
rates on other liabilities.  Overhead costs might not be passed onto lenders or borrowers, but
rather to bank shareholders. And using ex-ante spreads risks ignores the importance of macro-
economic variables: banks will, for example, hold more capital in a volatile macro-environment,
raising the costs of financial intermediation.  Analysis of the contributing factors for ex-ante
spreads might thus presume direct relationships, whereas in reality one needs to consider the
whole operation of the bank.  Ex-post spreads, the difference between banks’ actual interest
revenues and interest expenses, on the other hand, allows us to analyze the determinants of
interest margins in a more general equilibrium setting and to quantify the net effects of a broad
set of specific distortions imposed on banks, depositors and borrowers.
Using bank-level data for 80 countries over the 1988-95 period, Demirgüç -Kunt and Huizinga
(1999) identify the importance of a number of factors determining ex-post interest margins and
the incidence of intermediation costs imposed on banks.   Their empirical analysis controls for
country-specific and time specific effects and for the variation in the number of banks across
countries. Although cross-country analysis does not allow us to include the richness of
institutional details, such as tax codes, it enables us to compare the determinants of interest
margins in Brazil relative to other countries.  Applying their findings to Brazil, the following
main factors can explain the high interest margins in Brazil:
•   Overhead costs. In general, about one sixth of a bank’s overhead is at the margin passed onto
its customers. Since Brazilian banks’ overhead costs (10 percentage points of assets over












average, these costs add substantially to the margins. These high overhead costs in Brazil can
be partly explained by a low leverage of banks (as high macro-economic risks has required
banks to hold large capital) and limited competitive pressures within the banking system.
The judicial inefficiency in Brazil may also have added to costs, as banks have needed large
collection and legal departments.
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•   Inflation and high real interest rates. Inflation and high real interest rates raise margins as
banks try to compensate for the erosion of their real capital and maintain a competitive return
on equity.  Furthermore, high inflation also increases the costs of banking, as the number of
transactions increases.  Inflation rates and high real interest rates have been important factors
underlying the high spreads in Brazil.  Brazilian banks extended their branch network and
payroll significantly during the high-inflation period to collect deposits and obtain float
revenues.  Although inflation rates have decreased considerably since the Real plan, the fear
of resurgence of inflation might explain partially the high net interest margins that can still be
observed.
•   Reserve requirements.  Reserve requirements with less than market remuneration lower net
interest income, but the degree to which depends on the possible pass-through to bank
customers. In general, un-renumerated reserves have lowered banks net interest income,
suggesting less than full pass-through to depositors and borrowers.
•   Income taxes are typically completely passed onto bank customers and therefore constitute an
important distortion for the financial system. Brazil’s taxes on banks (1.1 percent of assets
over 1988-95) are more than double the Latin American and upper-middle income country
average, thus raising margins significantly.
•   Poor legal and institutional development, including the lack of judicial efficiency, poor
contract enforcement and high levels of corruption tends to increase bank margins, since
banks have greater difficulty collecting on loans.  A better legal and institutional framework,
on the other hand, tends to lower interest margins.  As Brazil scores quite poor on indicators
of legal and institutional development, its margins are higher.
Other determinants of net interest margins are the quality of accounting standards and degree of
credit information sharing.  Both affect the ability of intermediaries to assess and monitor
borrowers and their projects.  Deficiencies in these areas increase both bad loan decisions and
losses.  Again, as noted before, Brazil scores poorly in these dimensions.
Of all the factors, the legal deficiencies are the most important in explaining the high ex-post
margins in Brazil.  The importance of a more efficient legal system for lowering net interest
margins is underlined by the following policy experiment (see also the results of the regression
reported in Table A5).  If Brazil would increase contract enforceability to the OECD average, net
interest margins could decline by 3.5 percentage points, a 40 percent reduction from the average
margin of 8.9 percent over the period 1988-95.  Further reductions in margins can result from
lowering the high level of financial intermediation taxation.
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5.  Areas of Policy Emphasis for Brazil
Authorities are aware of the need to lower the costs of financial intermediation and have been
moving actively. Measures have been adopted to assure the legality for compound interest in
operations (previously an interested party in a contract argued against such procedure based on an
outdated law which forbade charging compound interest in loans lasting less than one year).  The
National Congress is examining a measure that creates a Bank Credit Bill, cédula de crédito
bancario, a credit instrument with a smoother and faster track in judicial disputes.  Other
regulatory reform efforts to reduce the cost of financial intermediation include the extension of
alienação fiduciaria to housing and mobile goods, and the legal separation of principal and
interest.
15  These are important measures to increase the enforceability of contracts in Brazil by
minimizing reliance on courts. Since they are fairly recent reforms, however, the full effects of
the legal reforms, their practical enforceability and the degree to which they avoid use of the
courts, cannot be assessed yet.
The government has also recently moved in several areas to reduce the direct costs of financial
intermediation.  It has lowered the costs by reducing tax and reserve requirement (the reserve
requirement for demand deposits has been lowered, for example, from 75% to 55%). A further
lowering of the level of financial intermediation taxation is planned.  A broad reform of Brazilian
payments system will increase its reliability and reduce the costs of financial intermediation. And
information availability has increased. The Central Bank operated Credit Risk Data Center
(Central de Risco) now makes available standardized information on credit operations and
financial institutions will report monthly their classification of credit operations above R$ 20,000
(from R$ 50,000 previously).  And greater transparency is achieved since the Central Bank
started making credit operations rates available on its web site (interest rates published are
highest, lowest and average for each type of operation, degree of arrears and average operation
term, all discriminated by financial institution).
The early evidence of the degree to which these benefits will be passed on to banks’ customers is
favorable with lending rates currently near a five-year low. Although the difference between bank
lending rates and government borrowing rates has decreased by 10 percentage points, further
reform will be necessary to lower the costs of financial intermediation.  Importantly, this will
have to involve further improvements in the efficiency of the legal system.  Reforms could
include a limitation on the availability or the levels of appeal, the creation of special courts,
increasing the precedent value of higher court decisions and educating judges in economic and
financial areas. While these are politically sensitive issues and can only be addressed over the
long run, improvements in the enforceability of contracts have high pay-offs for increasing
financial intermediation and growth in Brazil and should have high priority.
The judicial changes should be complemented by changes in the creditor rights. While, as in
other Latin American countries, bankruptcy reform has been on the agenda in Brazil for much of
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the past decade, little progress has been made.  In the mean time, important reforms have been
undertaken in Argentina (1995) and are being considered in Mexico. Brazil needs to accelerate
its efforts and learn from reform efforts elsewhere, particularly Argentina.  Important necessary
reforms in Brazil include a re-ordering of the priority of claims in liquidation and introducing a
workable process for restructuring troubled, but viable companies (under trustee administration,
not debtor-in-possession).
Reforms in creditor rights need to adopt international best practice ranking secured creditors
first and automatic replacement of  management and a more flexible bankruptcy law. Changes
in the bankruptcy law should allow for more flexibility in restructuring and reorganization, while
protecting the rights of creditors.  During the reorganization period, creditors or a third party
(receivership) should manage the company.  Reforms also need to allow for market mechanisms
for trading and consolidating claims, and procedures to accommodate repossession of collateral
in secured finance.  To date, possible advocates for bankruptcy reform—creditors (largely state-
owned) and potential borrowers—have not proven successful. It means reform will require
greater public education about the link between certainty of treatment of creditors in bankruptcy
and the availability (and cost) of finance in order to reverse the general tendency in Brazil to
favor debtors at all costs. Efforts in this direction are already underway in Argentina and
legislation is under consideration in Mexico.
This need for reform applies equally to Brazil’s laws on security interests, which are fragmented
among the civil code, the commercial laws, financial sector legislation and special laws for
certain kinds of instruments (e.g., mortgage securitization).  Recent legal innovations, such as the
use of trust-type mechanisms (alienação fiduciaria) to increase the prospects for effective
enforcement, are a (useful) stopgap measure.  But Brazil still needs to move to a uniform code
governing the creation, perfection and enforcement of securities interests. A “Secured
Transactions Code”, as it is being considered in Argentina and in Mexico, can facilitate the
creation, perfection and enforcement of security interests in financial transactions.  Such a law
should include the easy and inexpensive registration of security interests and a repossession
procedure that involves a minimum of court intervention. Without improvements in the
enforceability of contracts, however, these reforms might not be as effective as desired.
Recent improvements in credit information systems can be observed such as the Central de
Risco -, but more efforts should be made to make positive as well as negative information
available to creditors.  An appropriate legal and regulatory framework has to be developed to
facilitate the sharing of information on borrowers between financial institutions, private credit
information agencies and possibly the Central Bank building on existing institutions -, while at
the same time providing borrowers with adequate protection.  This might involve reviewing
existing laws on consumer protection and banking secrecy.  The Central Bank might also
consider how it can use its regulatory and supervisory power to encourage more information
sharing among financial institutions.  Other dimensions along which the credit information
systems can be improved include the speed with which credit information is processed such as
the bad check information and the quality and accuracy of the information.12
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Development









Number of observations 43 countries 40 countries
Source: Own calculations. Column 1 reports the results of the following regressions: Private Credit = β 0 + β 1
Contract Enforceability + β 2 log(1 + Inflation) + β 3 log ( Initial real per capita GDP). Higher values of the contract
enforceability variable indicate a higher degree of contract enforceability.  Column 2 reports the results of the
following regressions: Private Credit = β 0 + β 1 Black information dummy + β 2 Black and white information dummy
+ β 3 log(1 + Inflation) + β 4 log( Initial real per capita GDP). The two dummies take the value one if a country has a
black (black and white) credit information system. Both regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). P-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sources of data: Private credit: Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine (1999); contract enforceability: Business
International Corporation; black and black-and-white information: Japelli and Pagano (1999)
Table A2: The Impact of Financial Intermediation on Real Per Capita Growth





Number of observations 43
Source: Own calculations. The regression reported is: Average real per capita growth = β 0 + β 1 log(Initial real per
capita GDP) + β 2 log(1+ average years of schooling) + β 3 log(exports + imports as share of GDP) + β 4
log(Government Expenditures as share of GDP) + β 5 log(1 + Inflation rate) + β 6 log(1 + Black market premium) +
β 7 log(Private Credit. P-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Sources of data: Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine
(1999) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000).
Table A3: The Impact of Contract Enforcement on Industrial Growth
Dependent variable Industrial growth rate in value added, 1980-90
Contract Enforceability* 0.038
  External Dependence (0.001)
R
2 0.34
Number of observations 1042 (34 countries)15
Source: Own calculations. The regression includes both country and industry fixed effects and the industry’s share of
total value added in manufacturing in 1980. The P-value for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors is reported in
parentheses. The regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Source of data: External
dependence and industrial growth rates: Rajan and Zingales (1998). Brazil’s level of contract enforceability was 2.13
over the period 1980-89, while the OECD average was at 2.82.
Table A4: The Impact of Rule of Law on Firm Growth
Dependent variable Proportion of firms that growth faster than predicted by
firm characteristics, 1986-91




Number of observations 26 countries
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).The dependent variable is the proportion of firms in a country that
grow faster than predicted by internally available cash flow and short-term credit. Rule of Law is an indicator of the
degree to which citizens of a country are able to use the legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  The
regression is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and controls for other country and firm-specific
characteristics.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard error is reported in parentheses.  Brazil’s level of Rule of Law
was 3.7 for the sample period, while the OECD average was at 5.5.
Table A5: The Impact of Contract Enforcement on Net Interest Margins









Number of observations 4497
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). The regression reported controls for bank characteristics,
macroeconomic indicators, taxation measures, a deposit insurance dummy, measures of financial development and
structure, other institutional variables, such as corruption and law and order, and country and time specific effects.
The regression is estimated using weighted least squares. The number of banks in each country and each period is
used to weight the observations. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Brazil’s level of contract enforceability
was 1.9 during the sample period and its real GDP per capita $2,113, while the OECD average for contract
enforceability was 2.8.